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We study general equilibrium with nonconvexities. In these economies
there exist sunspot equilibria without the usual assumptions needed
in convex economies, and they have good welfare properties. More-
over, in these equilibria, agents act as if they have quasi-linear utility.
Hence wealth eﬀects vanish. We use this to construct a new model of
monetary exchange. As in Lagos-Wright, trade occurs in both central-
ized and decentralized markets, but while that model requires quasi-
linearity, we have general preferences. Given our speciﬁcation looks
much like the textbook Arrow-Debreu model, we think this consti-
tutes progress on the classic problem of integrating money and general
equilibrium theory. We also use the model to discuss another classic
issue: the relation between inﬂation and unemployment.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
We study economies with nonconvexities, and in particular with some indi-
visible goods, with several goals in mind. First, extending Shell and Wright
(1993) we show that in the presence of indivisibilities there exist sunspot
equilibria without the usual assumptions needed to generate such equilibria
in convex economies, and that these equilibria have good welfare properties
because sunspots allow convexiﬁcation similar to the way lotteries work in
the indivisible labor economy of Rogerson (1988).1 Second, we emphasize
something not appreciated in the existing literature on sunspots, lotteries
and nonconvexities: in these economies, as long as agents choose interior so-
lutions, in a sense to be made precise, they act as if they have quasi-linear
preferences.
It is true that it has been noted previously of the Rogerson model that,
when labor is indivisible, under certain additional assumptions that include
additive separability between consumption and leisure, agents act as if utility
is linear in leisure. But the result is far more general. The fact that for quite
general speciﬁcations agents act as if they have quasi-linear preferences is
useful for a variety of reasons. For one thing, it means that for the divisible
goods in the economy, wealth eﬀects vanish. This has many implications,
including the law of demand (the demand for each of the divisible goods
is unambiguously decreasing in its own price). Here we will emphasize the
usefulness of the results for monetary theory, as we now explain.
1A sunspot equilibrium is one in which extrinsic uncertainty (a random variable with
no impact on preferences, endowments, or technologies) aﬀects the allocation. In convex
economies, sunspot equilibria are necessarily ineﬃcient, because random allocations are
dominated by the average allocation. When some goods are indivisible, however, the
average may not be feasible. For some recent papers on nonconvexities, lotteries, and
sunspots, in addition to those cited here, see the 2002 special issue of JET
2A novel model of monetary exchange with microfoundations based on
search theory has been developed recently by Lagos and Wright (2005),
hereafter LW. The LW model is tractable because gets around the problem
of having to keep track of the distribution of money holdings. It works by
giving agents periodic access to centralized markets where they can adjust
their cash positions by buying and selling other goods, in addition to the
decentralized markets where money is essential. If agents have quasi-linear
utility, given interior solutions, they all take the same amount of money out
of the centralized market, and hence the distribution in the decentralized
market is degenerate. This makes the framework quite easy to analyze, and
hence allows one to extend and apply it in a number of ways.2
Although for some questions one would obviously like to have an en-
dogenous nondegenerate distribution of money holdings, it is useful to have
a benchmark without this complication, and to this extent the LW model
is interesting. One might object, however, that quasi-linear utility is very
special. Our results show that one does not actually need quasi-linearity: for
general preferences, as long as some goods are indivisible, and again given
interior solutions, agents act as if they have quasi-linear utility in the sense
that they all take the same amount of money out of the centralized market.
Thus, we provide an alternative set of assumptions that leads to a relatively
simple model of monetary exchange with explicit microfoundations.
2LW provide examples and references to other applications. An alternative approach
is provided by Shi (1997); Faig (2004) tries to integrate the two models, and gives some
results related to those derived below. For models that are much less tractable, precisely
because one has to keep track of the relevant distribution, see Green and Zhou (1998),
Zhou (1999), Molico (1999), Camera and Corbae (1999), Taber and Wallace (1999), or
Zhu (2003,2005). Earlier search-based models, such as Kiyotaki and Wright (1989,1993),
Aiyagari and Wallace (1991), Shi (1995), or Trejos and Wright (1995), were also very
simple, but only because they avoided the issue by assuming agents could only hold m ∈
{0,1} units of money.
3We make an eﬀort to describe the centralized market in the model in
a fairly general way — we have few restrictions on endowments, tastes, or
technologies other than those in standard general equilibrium (GE) theory,
except that we have some indivisible goods. This generality is adopted
because it entails little cost for what we do, and also because it indicates
that modern monetary theory is not as special as one might think based
on previous presentations. In earlier discussions of the LW model, e.g., the
centralized market typically has a single consumption good, consumers are
homogeneous in terms of preferences and endowments, ﬁrms (if there are
ﬁrms at all) are homogeneous, and so on. We show that most of these
special assumptions are completely unnecessary.
Indeed, our centralized market looks very much like the textbook Arrow-
Debreu model with state-contingent commodities (Debreu 1959, ch.7). Thus
we can appeal to some standard results in GE. Moreover, given we combine
this speciﬁcation with a micro-based monetary model, one might say that we
make a little progress on the classic problem of integrating of money and GE
theory. Interestingly, we think, progress here comes not from a Procrustean
eﬀort to force money into GE, but from bringing GE into monetary theory.
Finally, under a common interpretation in macro that labor is indivisible,
the model generates equilibrium unemployment.3 And since it is a monetary
model, we can use it to discuss another classic issue: the relation between
inﬂation and unemployment. We show that the model generates a long-
run Phillips curve that is either upward or downward sloping, depending on
preferences, in a simple and natural way.
3In addition to Rogerson (1988), a sample of well-known papers in macroeconomics
adopting the indivisible labor assumption includes Hansen (1985), Cooley and Hansen
(1989), and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992).
4The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss
indivisibilities and sunspots in GE, without money. We show that agents
not at a corner solution act as if they have quasi-linear utility, in the sense
that their demands for divisible goods are independent of wealth, and their
indirect utility functions are linear in wealth. We also discuss conditions
to guarantee interiority. In Section 3 we consider monetary economies. We
begin with brief review of LW. Then we present our alternative model, and
compare results. In Section 4 we discuss the relation between inﬂation and
unemployment. In Section 5 we conclude. Some technical results are rele-
gated to the Appendix.
2 GE with Nonconvexities
2.1 Equilibrium: Deﬁnition
We begin with a static GE model.4 T h e r ei sam e a s u r es p a c e(I,Ω,α) of
consumers, where I =[ 0 ,1], Ω a σ−algebra of subsets of I,a n dα the
uniform distribution over I.5 There are K ﬁrms indexed by k =1 ,...K.
There are J +1commodities: J standard consumption goods indexed by
j =1 ,...J, and one indivisible good. We call the indivisible good leisure,
following many examples in macro, although this label means little for now.
4By static, we do not mean the economy is timelss, since as usual we can interpret
goods as indexed by dates. We simply mean that there is a single market that convenes
before any production and consumption take place. Later we consider sequential-market
models.
5We take this speciﬁcation from Aumann (1964,1966), who introduced equilibrium
with a continuum of agents. We do not actually need a continuum here, but it is adopted
because in the monetary models discussed below, as in much of the literature, when
combined with random matching it generates anonymity. It is worth mentioning that
we could get away with a ﬁnite number of agents (for the GE results, and also for the
m o n e t a r yr e s u l t sa sl o n ga sw eh a v es o m eo t h e rw a yt om o t i v a t ea n o n y m i t y )b e c a u s ew e
use sunspots as opposed to lotteries; the latter generally need the law of large numbers
while the former do not (Shell and Wright 1993; Garratt, Keister and Shell 2004).
5By saying leisure is indivisible, we mean that it must either be consumed in
a single unit or not at all.
Agent i starts with 1 unit of leisure, and an arbitrary endowment of the
other goods ei ∈ RJ
+,w h e r eei : I → RJ
+ is I−measurable and ¯ e =
R
eidi.
Consumer i has preferences represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function Ui(c,h),w h e r ec ∈ RJ
+ is consumption and h ∈ {0,1} is
labor, which equals 1 minus leisure. The consumption set for each agent is
denoted C = RJ
+×{0,1}. We assume Ui is twice continuously diﬀerentiable,
strictly increasing in c, strictly decreasing in h, and strictly concave. To ease
the presentation, we Uj(c,h) →∞as cj → 0 for all j,w h e r eUj denotes the
partial derivative with respect to cj; this guarantees cj > 0 in equilibrium.
Consumption goods are produced by ﬁr m su s i n gl a b o ra st h eo n l yi n -









+,w h e r efk
j (nk) is output of good j. Assume fk
is continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing and concave. It is possible that
fk
j (nk)=0for all n for some j —i . e .e a c hﬁrm k does not necessarily pro-
duce every good — but for any good it does produce fk
j is strictly increasing
and concave. Proﬁtf o rﬁrm k (deﬁned below) is Πk, and the share of Πk
paid to consumer i is ηi
k ∈ R+ where
R
ηi
kdi =1 . Thus total dividend income




Consumers are generally heterogenous, but for simplicity we assume
there are only a ﬁnite number of types T;t h a ti s ,I = ∪T
τ=1Iτ,w h e r e
Ui = Uτ, ei = eτ and ηi
k = ητ
k for all i ∈ Iτ. Also, for simplicity, there is
no intrinsic uncertainty: all of the fundamentals are deterministic. However,
there is extrinsic uncertainty, represented by the probability space (S,Σ,π),
where S =[ 0 ,1] is the set of states representing “sunspot activity,” Σ the
6Borel sets on S,a n dπ the uniform distribution over S. For what we do here,
the choice of a uniform distribution is without loss in generality (Garratt,
Keister, Qin and Shell 2002). Although the realization of s ∈ S does not
aﬀect preferences, technology or endowments, in principle it could still aﬀect
individual’s behavior.
Given indivisible goods, having allocations potentially depend on extrin-
sic uncertainty allows a certain convexiﬁcation, which can lead to eﬃciency
gains over nonrandomized allocations.6 Following Shell and Wright (1993),
we formalize this by assuming complete Arrow-Debreu markets in (sunspot)
state-contingent commodities. Thus, the commodity space is the set of π-
measurable functions from S into C. Similarly, nk(s) is ﬁrm k 0se m p l o y m e n t
rule, a π-measurable function from S into R+.L e tp(s)=[ p1(s),...pJ(s)] ∈
RJ
+ be the price vector of consumption goods and w(s) ∈ R+ the price of
labor in state s.7 For all ˜ S ⊂ S, e.g.,
R
˜ S pj(s)ds i st h ec o s to fau n i to fg o o d




give a point in commodity space for




an employment rule for every ﬁrm k.





















6One can deﬁne competitive equilibrium without sunspots in the model. By the First
Welfare Theorem, which does not require convexity, if it exists such an equilibrium is
Pareto optimal within the set of nonrandomized allocations. It is easy to provide robust
examples, however, where it is Pareto dominated by randomized allocations, including
sunspot equilibrium allocations (Shell and Wright 1993).
7We restrict attention to price systems that have an inner-product representation (see





p(s)ci(s) − w(s)hi(s) − p(s)ei − ∆i¤
ds ≤ 0; (2)
(ii) given [p(s),w(s)], ∀kn k(s) solves
























−¯ e =0 . (5)
Garratt et al. (2002, Theorem 1) show that in this kind of model, every
sunspot equilibrium allocation can be supported by prices, when adjusted for
probabilities, that are constant across states.8 Therefore, in the following,
we can set [p(s),w(s)] = (p,w) for all s ∈ S. Based on this it is immediate
that the solution to the ﬁrm problem in (3) is constant across all states
— to be more accurate, almost surely with respect to π, but to ease the
presentation we describe results as holding in all states.
Lemma 1 ∀k, nk(s)=nk ∀s ∈ S.
Proof. The result follows directly from the strict concavity of fk
j in any
good j that ﬁrm k produces.
Something similar is true for consumers, except that in general we must
distinguish between states where they are employed and those where they
are not. Let Si
1 =
©
s ∈ S : hi(s)=1
ª
be the set of states where i is employed
and Si
0 = S\Si
1,w h e r ew ea s s u m eSi
1,Si
0 ∈ Σ.A l s o , l e t  i = π(Si
1) be the
8This is a very intuitive arbitrage-like result: since fundamentals are state-invariant,
a good delivered if s occurs better have the same price as a good delivered if s
0 occurs,
given s and s
0 occur with equal probability.
8probability that i is employed. Then consumer choices are constant across
states (again, almost surely) in each of these sets.
Lemma 2 ∀i, ci(s)=ci
1 ∀s ∈ Si
1 and ci(s)=ci
0 ∀s ∈ Si
0.

















ci(s)ds − w i − pei − ∆i ≤ 0, (7)
where the maximization is over the sets Si
1 and Si
0,a sw e l la sci
1(s),w h i c h
is consumption in state s ∈ S1,a n dci
0(s), which is consumption in state
s ∈ S0. The result now follows from the strict concavity of Ui.
Lemma 2 implies (6) can be reduced to  iUi(ci





and (7) to  ipci
1+(1− i)pci
0−w i−xi ≤ 0,w h e r exi = pei+∆i is non-labor
income or wealth.9 Clearly, i cares only about the probability with which
he works,  i = π(Si
1), and not about which states are in Si
1.A l s o , n o t e
that while ci
1 does not equal ci
0, in general, it does for some speciﬁcations.
The following result says that if some commodities enter Ui separably from
h, then the demand for these commodities is the same whether or not i is
employed. As a special case, if Ui(ci,h)=ui(ci)+vi(h),t h e nci
1 = ci
0.
Lemma 3 Suppose we can partition ci =( ˆ ci,˜ ci), so that Ui(ci,h)=ui(˜ ci)+
vi(ˆ ci,h).T h e n˜ ci(s)=˜ ci ∀s ∈ S.
Proof. The result follows directly from strict concavity.
9Implicitly, x
i depends on p directly, and on ∆
i which also depends on p.
9Given Lemmas 1 and 2, we can summarize the decisions of all ﬁrms by





, which allows us to present a much
simpler deﬁnition of equilibrium.10 First, one more piece of notation: let
I1(s)=
©
i ∈ I : hi(s)=1
ª
= {i ∈ I : s ∈ Si
1} be the set of agents who are
employed, and I0(s)=I\I1(s) the set who are unemployed, for each state
s,w h e r ew ea s s u m eI1(s),I 0(s) ∈ Ω. We need to include I1(s) in our list of
equilibrium objects because we need to know who is working (and not just
the measure of the set of employed agents) in each state.








(i) given (p,w), ∀i (ci
1,ci
0,  i) solves















1 +( 1−  i)pci
0 − w i − xi ≤ 0; (9)
(ii) given (p,w), ∀kn k solves










(iii) ∀s ∈ S,
X
k


















 i = π{s : I1(s) 3 i}. (13)
10It is simpler mainly because the ﬁrm problem has been reduced to choosing n
k and





i),w h i c ha r eﬁnite-dimensional objects, instead
functions.
10Labor demand on the left side of (11) is constant across states; hence
so is labor supply on the right side. This means we have to construct I1(s)
so that the same measure of workers are employed for all s,a n dt h el a s t
consistency condition says that we need to do so in such a way that each
agent i is working with his chosen probability  i. For example, suppose
we have homogeneous consumers, so  i = ¯   for all i. T h e ni ne q u i l i b r i u m
P
k nk = ¯  .W eh a v et oc o n s t r u c tI1(s) so that a fraction ¯   of consumers are
working in every state, and they are all working in a fraction ¯   of the states.
Figure 1: Set of agents working in each state.
This type of construction can be done by generalizing the method in Shell
and Wright (1993). Consider an example with two types of consumers: the
set [0,α] are type 1 a n dw i s ht ow o r kw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y 1, while the rest are




α +  1¤
modulo





1−α +  2
i
modulo  2 for i ∈ (α,1].F i g u r e1
shows as the shaded area pairs (s,i) such that i is employed in state s.T h e n
every consumer is working with the desired probability, and the measure of
I1(s) (total employment) is α 1 +( 1− α) 2 for all s. However, there is a
simpler alternative when we have a continuum of consumers. If type τ want
to work with probability  τ,i ne a c hs t a t es set hτ =1with probability
 τ, and by the law of large numbers a measure  τ will be working in each
state.11
2.2 Equilibrium: Properties
N o wt h a tw eh a v ed e ﬁned equilibrium, we provide some substantive results.











1 +( 1−  i)ci
0
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This suggests that our economy has a reduced form that looks like a model
with no sunspots, where agents simply trade a probability of working  i for
wages, and use it to buy consumption, in the spirit of lottery models such
as Rogerson (1986).
Ap a r t i c u l a r l ys i m p l ec a s ei st h eo n ew h e r eUi(ci,h i)=ui(ci)+vi(hi)
is separable in h, since then Lemma 3 implies ci
1 = ci
0 = ci. Witout loss in
generality, set vi(1) = 0 and vi(0) = A>0. Then the consumer problem
can be simpliﬁed further to







11Again, we do not need the law of large numbers for sunspot equilibrium, as one does
for lottery equilibrium, but it does simplify things.
12s.t. pci − w i − xi ≤ 0. (17)
In this case, it is as if the consumer had a utility function that was linear in  i.
Assuming an interior solution, the ﬁrst-order condition for any commodity
j is ui
j(ci)=Aipj/w. This immediately implies ∂cj/∂xi =0 , ∂cj/∂pj =
Aipj/wui
jj < 0,a n d∂Wi/∂xi = Ai/w. Hence, in this very special case it is
obvious that wealth eﬀects are 0, demand curves slope downward, and the
indirect utility function is linear in xi.
We now show these results are general, in the sense that they do not
require Ui to be separable in hi; all we need is interiority.
Proposition 1 Suppose  i ∈ (0,1) and w−pci
1+pci
0 6=0 .T h e n∂ci
hj/∂xi =
0 ∀i,j,a n dh =0 ,1.
Proof. Consider the Lagrangian
W =  U (c1,1) + (1 −  )U (c0,0) (18)
+λ[w + x −  pc1 − (1 −  )pc0]
where λ>0 is the multiplier, and we leave of the index i where there is no
risk of confustion. In the Appendix we show that there is a unique solution
to this problem, and assuming   ∈ (0,1) it uniquely satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order
conditions:
c1 : Uj(c1,1) − λpj =0∀j (19)
c0 : Uj(c0,0) − λpj =0∀j (20)
  : U (c1,1) − U (c0,0) + λ(w − pc1 + pc0)=0 (21)
λ : w + x −  pc1 − (1 −  )pc0 =0 (22)
13Notice that x does not appear in (19)-(21). By the Implicit Function Theo-





00 w − pc1 + pc0
⎤
⎦
is nonsingular, where Hh is the Hessian matrix with (i,j) term Uij(ch,h) and
pT is the transpose. By strict concavity of U, |Hh| < 0 and so nonsingularity
is equivalent to w − pc1 + pc0 6=0 .
In the above result we rule out the possibility w −pc1 +pc0 =0 ,w h i c h
is equivalent to U (c1,1) = U (c0,0) by (21). It is well known that this
possibility arises for a very special utlity function in the case of 1 good,
U(c,h)=u[c+v(h)].12 More generally, consider U(c,h)=u[cJ +v(c−J,h)]
where c−J =( c1,...c J−1) (i.e. a concave transformation of a utility function
that is linear in some good, that we assume without loss in generality is cJ).
The ﬁrst order conditions (19)-(22) still hold, but now notice that for good
J, (19) and (20) tell us
u0[c1J +v(c−J
1 ,1)] = u0[c0J +v(c−J
0 ,0)] ⇒ c1J +v(c−J
1 ,1) = c0J +v(c−J
0 ,0).
(23)
Hence in this case U (c1,1) = U (c0,0) and (?? implies w − pc1 + pc0 =0 .
Now we cannot solve (19)-(21) for (c1,c0,λ) independently of x. Indeed,
(22) now implies pc0 = x.
However, notice (19)-(20) imply for j 6= J
u0[c1J + v(c1,1)]vj(c1,1) = λpj ⇒ vj(c1,1) = pj/pJ, j =1 ,2...J − 1
u0[c0J + v(c0,0)]vj(c0,0) = λpj ⇒ vj(c0,0) = pj/pJ, j =1 ,2...J − 1
12See e.g. Cooper (1987) or Rogerson and Wright (1988).
14We can solve these for c−J
1 = c−J
1 (p) and c−J
0 = c−J
0 (p). Then (23) implies
c1J − c0J = v[c−J
0 (p),0] − v[c−J
1 (p),1].
Now we can conclude two things. First, normalizing pJ =1with no loss in
generality,
w = p(c1 − c0)=p−J[c−J
1 (p) − c−J
0 (p)] + v[c−J
0 (p),0] − v[c−J
1 (p),1],
which says that w must be a particular function of p;t h i si sn o n g e n e r i ci n
partial equilibrium, but can easily occur in general equilibrium.13 Second,
from pc0 = x we have
c0J = x − p−Jc−J
0 ;
in this case it is c0J that adjusts with x to satisfy the budget equation, and
all other variables are independent of x.
Given we can handle the above special case, to conserve space we will
ignore it and simply assume w − pci
1 + pci
0 6=0in most of what follows.
Proposition 2 Under the conditions in Proposition 1, ∂ci
hj/∂pj < 0 ∀i,j
and h =0 ,1.
Proof. Exercise.
Proposition 3 Under the conditions in Proposition 1, ∂Wi/∂xi = λi is
independent of xi.
13Say consumers are homogeneous, J =1 , and there is a representative ﬁrm with
f
0(0) = ∞ and f
0(1) = 0.T h e n  = n ∈ (0,1) in equilibrium so w will adjust to satisfy
the relevant condition, which with J =1is w/p = v(0) − v(1). That is, the real wage
exactly compensates workers for lost leisure.
15Proof. We can rearrange (18) as
W = U (c0,0) + λx − λpc0
+ [U (c1,1) − U (c0,0) + λ(w − pc1 + pc0)].
By (21), the term in brackets vanishes. From Proposition 1, c0 and λ are
independent of x, and the result follows.
Consider an economy where consumers are homogeneous with respect to
preferences and wealth. Consider any equilibrium. Now change the distri-
bution of wealth across agents. Then there is an equilibrium where prices
and individual consumption are exactly the same as in the homogeneous-
wealth economy, and although individual employment probabilities may be
diﬀerent, aggregate employment is the same. The only requirement is interi-
ority for  i. As we discuss at the end of this section, this can be guaranteed
in a homogeneous-wealth economy with certain assumptions on technology.
Given interiority for a homogeneous-wealth economy, we can then guarantee
interiority with heterogeneous wealth by putting bounds on the extent of the
heterogeneity.
Proposition 4 Assume Ui = U ∀i.L e t
n
ˆ c1,ˆ c0, ˆ  ,(ˆ nk),ˆ p, ˆ w
o
be an equilib-
rium when xi =ˆ x ∀i, satisfying the conditions in Proposition 1. Give each
consumer i at r a n s f e rti in units of the numeraire good, so that xi =ˆ x+ ti,
where
R
I tidi =0 . Then there exist x>0 and x < x,c o n s t r u c t e di nt h e
proof, with the following property: if xi ∈ (x,x) ∀i, then an equilibrium ex-






=( ˆ c1,ˆ c0) ∀i.
Although  i may diﬀer with i,
R
I  idi = ˆ  .
16Proof. In the homogeneous-wealth economy, from the budget equation,
ˆ   =
ˆ pˆ c0 − ˆ x
ˆ w + ˆ pˆ c0 − ˆ pˆ c1
∈ (0,1) (24)
by assumption. Now consider the economy with transfers, and set (p,w)=
(ˆ p, ˆ w). From (10), nk =ˆ nk and Πk = ˆ Πk. From Proposition 1, if  i is
interior ∀i then (ci
1,ci
0)=( ˆ c1,ˆ c0). From the budget equation,
 i =
ˆ pˆ c0 − xi




I  idi = ˆ  . Since all aggregate quantities are the
same, markets clear.
It remains to give conditions on the distribution such that  i ∈ (0,1) ∀i.
Suppose ˆ w + pˆ c0 − pˆ c1 > 0.T h e n
 i > 0 iﬀ xi < x = ˆ pˆ c0
 i < 1 iﬀ xi >x= ˆ pˆ c1 − ˆ w.
Now suppose ˆ w + pˆ c0 − pˆ c1 < 0.T h e n
 i > 0 iﬀ xi >x= ˆ pˆ c0
 i < 1 iﬀ xi < x = ˆ pˆ c1 − ˆ w.
Note that in both cases x>0 and x < x.A s l o n g a s xi ∈ (x,x) ∀i,t h e n
 i ∈ (0,1) for all i.N o t et h a txi ∈ (x,x) ∀i is possible because ˆ x ∈ (x,x) by
(24). This completes the proof.
In fact, it is easy to generalize Proposition 4 so that it holds without the
assumption of homogeneous preferences.
Corollary 1 Suppose there are T consumer types, with Ui = Uτ for all
i ∈ Iτ,w h e r e∪T
τ=1Iτ = I. Suppose there is an equilibrium when xi =ˆ xτ
17∀i ∈ Iτ satisfying the conditions in Proposition 1. Give each consumer i a
transfer ti so that now xi =ˆ xτ + ti,w h e r e
R
Iτ tidi =0∀τ.T h e nt h e r ee x i s t
xτ > 0 and xτ < xτ with the following property: if xi ∈ (xτ,xτ) ∀i ∈ Iτ, ∀τ,
then an equilibrium exists with  i ∈ (0,1) ∀i and it has the same prices, the
same consumption, and the same total employment for every type.
Proof. Exercise.
These results say that, as long as it is not too disperse, the wealth dis-
tribution does not matter for consumption or aggregate employment. When
wealth diﬀers across agents, rich agents will work less and poor agents more,
but nothing else changes. This is useful in the monetary economy studied
below, where it implies that even if agents enter the market with diﬀerent
amounts of money, they exit with the same. To preview how this works, we
present an example where we put money in the utility function — we commit
this sin only for the sake of illustration, and in the next section the value of
money is derived from ﬁrst principles.
Thus, in addition to leisure, there are two goods, c =( c, ˆ m),c a l l e d
consumption and money. The endowment is ei =( 0 ,m i) with
R
midi =
M (here m denotes money brought into the market and ˆ m money taken
out). We normalize the price of money to 1,s op is the nominal price of
consumption. Money cannot be produced, while c is produced according to
c = Bn, so that the real equilibrium wage in units of consumption is B.14
Suppose U(c, ˆ m,h)=l o gc − v(h)+V (ˆ m),w i t hv(1) − v(0) = A>1.S i n c e
U is separable in h,w ek n o wc0 = c1 = c and ˆ m0 =ˆ m1 =ˆ m. Hence the
14The fact the production function is not strictly concave here causes no problems.
18consumer problem is
W(m)=m a x
c, ˆ m, 
{logc + V (ˆ m) − A }
s.t. c − B −
m − ˆ m
p
≤ 0.













The ﬁrst-order conditions for an interior solution imply c = B/Aand V 0(ˆ m)=
A/Bp; hence, c and ˆ m are ineed independent of m.G i v e nc, the technology













(m − M)V 0(M)
A
,
after inserting market clearing, ˆ m = M,a n dp = A/BV 0(M).C l e a r l y ,  is
decreasing in m,a n d  ∈ (0,1) iﬀ m ∈ (m,m),w h e r e
m = M −
A − 1
V 0(M)




The previous example assumes separability in h. Suppose instead that
U(c, ˆ m,h)=ca(1+b−h)1−a+V (ˆ m),w h e r e0 <a<1 and 0 <b<(1−a)/a.
Now we do not have c0 = c1, although we still have ˆ m0 =ˆ m1 =ˆ m.T h e
consumer problem is
W =m a x
©
 ca
1b1−a +( 1−  )ca
0(1 + b)1−a + V 0(ˆ m)
ª
s.t.  c1 +( 1−  )c0 − B −
m − ˆ m
p
≤ 0.
This time, we substitute for ˆ m and take the ﬁrst-order conditions:
c1 : aca−1
1 b1−a = pV 0(ˆ m)
c0 : aca−1
0 (1 + b)1−a = pV 0(ˆ m)
  : ca
1b1−a − ca
0(1 + b)1−a = pV 0(ˆ m)[c1 − c0 − B]
19These can be solved for c0 = abB/(1 − a), c1 = a(1 + b)B/(1 − a) and
V 0(ˆ m)=aa(1 − a)1−aBa−1/p. Again, c1, c0 and ˆ m are independent of m.
Now n = a(1 + b) ∈ (0,1). From the budget equation,
  = a(1 + b)+( M − m)a−a(1 − a)aBaV 0(M),
after inserting ˆ m = M and p. Hence,   ∈ (0,1) iﬀ m ∈ (m,m),w h e r e
m = M −
aaBa(1 − a − ab)
(1 − a)aV 0(M)
and m = M +
a1+a(1 + b)Ba
(1 − a)aV 0(M)
.
As one can see, it is easy to solve examples, and to construct (m,m) explic-
itly.
2.3 Equilibrium: Existence.
We close this section with a discussion of existence in the general model.











1 +( 1−  i)ci
0
¤








We claim the following is true: (i) As we show in the Appendix, even though
Wi is not strictly quasi-concave, there is a unique solution to the consumer
problem (ci
1,ci
0,  i) and it is a continuous function of (p,w).I t i s c l e a r
on the ﬁrm side, proﬁt maximization determines nk as a continuous func-
tion of (p,w). Hence, excess demand is a continuous function of (p,w).
(ii) It is clear that excess demand is homogeneous of degree 0. (iii) Inte-
grating the budget equations over agents, it is also clear that Walras’ Law
holds: wN(p,w)+pZ(p,w)=0 .( i v ) A l s o , Z(p,w) and N(p,w) can be
bounded below as long as we bound the production function fk for all k.( v )
20max[Zj(pn,w n),N(pn,w n)] →∞for any sequence s.t. (pn,w n) → (p,w)
with pj =0or w =0 ,a sl o n ga sUi and fk are strictly increasing.
Properties (i)-(v) allow us to apply a standard existence result, such as
Proposition 17.C.1 in Mas-Collel, Whinston and and Green (1995). Basi-
cally, by reducing the model to something that resembles a standard GE
economy we can show an equilibrium exists using standard methods.
Proposition 5 Given the assumptions in the text, ∃(p,w) such that Z(p,w)=
0 and N(p,w)=0 .
Of course, existence does not guarantee  i ∈ (0,1) for all i.S i n c em a n y
of our results about the properties of equilibrium depend on it, it would be
good to have some additional conditions to guarantee interiority. One way
one might imagine proceeding is to put curvature restrictions on technology.
Thus, if we assume that for at least one ﬁrm k and good j, ∂fk
j (n)/∂n →∞
as n → 0, then clearly aggregate labor demand satisﬁes   =
P
k nk > 0
in any equilibrium. And if we assume that for every ﬁrm k and good j,
∂fk
j (n)/∂n → 0 as n → ¯ nk where
P
k ¯ nk ≤ 1,t h e n  =
P
k nk < 1 in any
equilibrium. However, this assumption would contradict property (v) that
we used for existence. Therefore, we take a diﬀerent route. To illustrate the
logic of the argument we restrict our attention on the case with J =1good,
K =1ﬁrm, and homogeneous consumers. If n =1in equilibrium then the
utility of a representative consumer is U[f(1) + e,1]. To rule-out such an
equilibrium assume
U[f(1) + e,1] <U[f(1) + e − f0(1),0]. (28)
If (28) holds then a consumer would be better oﬀ choosing   =0instead of
  =1 . Condition (28) holds provided f0(1) is suﬃciently small. Since U(·,·)
21is continuous, condition (28) can be restated as f0(1) < ¯ ω where ¯ ω>0 solves
U[f(1) + e,1] = U[f(1) + e − ¯ ω,0]. Hence, in a homogeneous consumer
economy, in any equilibrium   =
P
k nk ∈ (0,1) provided (28) holds. By
Proposition 4, if wealth is heterogeneous there is still an equilibrium where
 i ∈ (0,1) ∀i, as long as wealth is not too heterogeneous.
One could generalize the previous reasoning to J g o o d sa sf o l l o w s .D e ﬁne
ˆ W(c,1) = max
c1
U (c1,1) s.t. pc1 − pf(1) − e =0 ,
where p is a solution to c1 = f(1) + e.D e ﬁne next
ˆ W(c0,0) = max
c0
U (c0,0) s.t. pc0 − pf(1) − e + pf0(1) = 0
To guarantee that n =1is not an equilibrium we impose that ˆ W(c,1) <
ˆ W(c,0) for any p such that c1 = f(1) + e. This requires pf0(1) to be
suﬃciently small.
3M o n e t a r y T h e o r y
3.1 The LW Model
We begin with a review of LW, to provide the basic environment, notation,
etc. There is a [0,1] continuum of inﬁnite-lived agents. Time is discrete, and
each period is divided into two subperiods. In the ﬁrst subperiod there is a
frictionless centralized market CM. In the second subperiod there is a decen-
tralized market DM with two main frictions: a double-coincidence problem
detailed below, and anonymity, which precludes private credit arrangements.
These frictions make money essential.15
15See Kocherlakota (1998) and Wallace (2001) for formal discussions of essentiality,
especially the role of anonymity. We also emphasize that it is not important for the CM
22There is a single consumption good c in the CM. Agents have 0 endow-
ment of this good, but can produce it with technology c = h.A s s u m ef o r
now that agents can only make spot trades in the CM — i.e. they cannot
move resources across periods except by carrying money between markets
— but we argue below that this is really without loss of generality. In the
DM there is also one good q. Each agent faces the following possibilities in
the DM: with probability σ ≤ 1/2 he wants to consume and derives utility
u(q); with the same probability he has the ability to produce at disutility
cost ψ(q); and with probability 1−2σ he neither wants to consume nor can
produce. Agents who want to consume and those who can produce meet
bilaterally and anonymously in the DM, where they trade using money.16
Let q∗ be the quantity that solves u0(q)=ψ0(q);t h i si sa ni m p o r t a n t
benchmark because it is what a planner would choose — i.e. it is the eﬃcient
DM production. Agents discount between the CM and DM at rate β1,a n d
between the DM and the next CM at rate β2.L e tβ = β1β2.T h e r ei sas t o c k
of money that changes according to M+1 =( 1+γ)M, where the subscript
+1 indicates next period, and new money is injected (or withdrawn if γ<0)
via lump sum transfers (or taxes) in the CM. This completes the description
of the basic environment.
A na g e n t sw e a l t hi nt h eC Mi sxi = mi +γM, but since γM is constant
across agents we use mi as the individual state variable. Thus W(m) and
V (m) are the value functions in the CM and DM; they are not indexed by
and DM to meet sequentially; versions where they meet simultaneously, but agents cannot
be at both places at the same time, are developed by Williamson (2005), and generalized
by Telyukova and Wright (2005).
16No agent can both produce and consume, but this is easy to relax. In fact, in LW,
all agents can do both, but there are many specialized goods; so whether one consumes
or produces depends on whom one meets, and some direct barter meetings are possible.
The speciﬁcation here is equivalent for our purposes, and slightly easier to present.
23i since agents are identical except for their current money balances. Then
W(m)=m a x
c,h,ˆ m
{U(c,h)+β1V (ˆ m)} (29)
s.t. pc +ˆ m − ph − m − γM ≤ 0. (30)
The solution in general depends on m. Hence, a distribution of m across
agents entering the CM induces a distribution of ˆ m across agents entering
the DM. If U(c,h) is linear in either c or h, however, LW show that ˆ m
is independent of m, so the distribution across agents entering the DM
is degenerate at ˆ m = M(1 + γ).17 LW also show that W is linear with
∂W/∂m =1 /p.
In the DM, in each match between a consumer and producer, they bar-
gain over the quantity of goods q and amount of money d to swap, according
to the generalized Nash solution with bargaining power for the consumer θ.
The deal is constrained by d ≤ ˆ m. LW show that in equilibrium consumers
trade all their money, d =ˆ m, in exchange for q = q(ˆ m),w h e r eq(·) is given





We go into more detail on bargaining in the next subsection, where the
derivation of (31) will be clear; for now we simply note that it is the price in
the next CM, p+1, that is relevant for q in this DM.18 Given these results,
17There are two caveats: the distribution of m across agents in the CM cannot be too
disperse, since we need interior solutions; and one has to check that V is strictly concave.
LW give assumptions on primitives to guarantee both.
18Note that (31) is the solution for m only below a threshold m




∗);L Wp r o v et h a tm<m
∗ in any equilibrium, so we can ignore this
detail. Also note that LW consider only the case β2 =1 , but this is not crucial.
24the DM value function satisﬁes
V (ˆ m)=σ {u[q(ˆ m)] + β2W+1 (0)} (32)
+σ {−ψ [q(M+1)] + β2W+1(ˆ m + M+1)}
+(1 − 2σ)β2W+1(ˆ m)
The model is solved as follows. Given quasi-linearity, say U = u(c) − h,
substitutue h from the CM budget equation into W, and take the ﬁrst-order
condition with respect to ˆ m:
β1V 0(ˆ m)=1 /p. (33)
The envelope condition from (32) is V 0(ˆ m)=σu0(q)q0(ˆ m)+( 1− σ)β2/p+1.






















Finally, the bargaining solution implies 1/p+1 = g(q)/β2M(1+γ) and (lag-










Given a sequence or γ, any strictly positive and bounded solution to this
diﬀerence equation in q constitutes a monetary equilibrium19 If γ is constant,
it makes sense to consider a steady state where all real variables, including q,
19LW deﬁne equilibrium more formally, but it should be clear that, once one has the
path for q, one can recover all of the other endogenous variables.
25are constant. Then the inﬂation rate is γ, the real interest rate is ρ deﬁned
by β =1 /(1 + ρ), and the nominal interest rate is i =( 1+ρ)(1 + γ) − 1.








This is the basic LW model.20
We close this section by arguing that, in any equilibrium, the assumption
of only spot trades in the CM is not restrictive. First note that no trades
can be made for delivery in any meeting of a future DM, since in this market
meetings are anonymous (hence, anyone who was supposed to deliver in this
market would simply renege). For similar reasons no trades can be made in
the CM contingent on events in any future DM (no one sees what happens
to other agents in the DM). So we are left with trades made in the current
CM for delivery in some future CM. But in equilibrium no one partakes of
these trades, for the following reason.
Suppose we open a market for Arrow securities that deliver 1 unit of
purchasing power (money) in the next CM. Let W(m,b) now be the value
function for an agent entering the CM with money m and security holdings
b,a n dl e tˆ b be a vector of assets purchased that period. Note that these
Arrow securites are not tangible assets that can be traded bilaterally in
the DM — they are simply promises of purchasing power to be delivered in
the next CM. Extending our earlier results, one can show that (ˆ m,ˆ b) is
independent of (m,b). Hence, all agents choose the same portfolio, and the
market clears at ˆ b =0 . Therefore, we can shut down these asset markets.
20We do not dwell on substantive results here, except to mention the following. Under
standard assumptions, a monetary equilibrium exists iﬀ i ≥ 0.F o r i>0, q<q
∗,s o
equilibrium is ineﬃcient. Welfare is maximized at the Friedman Rule, i =0 , but if θ<1
then we have q<q
∗ even at i =0 . See LW for details.
263.2 A New Model
We now consider a model similar to LW, except for two main diﬀerences:
instead of quasi-linearity, we allow a general utility function; and we assume
indivisible labor. We also introduce some other extensions, such a general
vector of consumption goods c, arbitrary endowments e which can diﬀer
over time, proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms, and so on, but we continue to assume
homogeneous preferences for now: Ui = U(c,h) for all i. The key assumption
is indivisible labor, and given this, we consider sunspot equilibria. As in the
previous section, we assume only spot trades, but argue below that this is
again without loss in generality.
In terms of state-contingent commodities, the CM consumer problem is
















p(s)ci(s)+ˆ mi(s) − w(s)hi(s) − p(s)ei − mi − γM − ∆i¤
ds ≤ 0.
This is formally equivalent to the consumer problem in Deﬁnition 1, even
though money is not a standard commodity here.21 H e n c ew ec a nf o c u so n
equilibria with [p(s),w(s)] = (p,w). Then we know [ci(s), ˆ mi(s)] = (ci
1, ˆ mi
1)
for all s such that hi(s)=1and [ci(s), ˆ mi(s)] = (ci
0, ˆ mi
0) for all s such that
hi(s)=0b yL e m m a1a n dL e m m a2 .A n dg i v e nˆ mi and hi enter separably,
we know ˆ mi
1 =ˆ mi
0 =ˆ mi by Lemma 3.
Therefore the problem reduces to















+ β1V i(ˆ mi)
ª
s.t.  ipci
1 +( 1−  i)pci
0 +ˆ mi − w i − xi ≤ 0,
21One detail is that one has to show that V
i is well behaved, including strictly concave;
t h i sc a nb ed o n ef o l l o w i n gt h em e t h o d si nL W .















− λipj =0∀j (39)
















ˆ mi : β1V 0(ˆ mi) − λi =0 (41)
λi : w i + xi −  ipci
1 − (1 −  i)pci
0 − ˆ mi =0 (42)
Observe that (38)-(40) constitute 2J +1equations in 2J +1unknowns.
Under the assumptions of Propostion 1, and in particular w−pci
1+pci
0 6=0 ,
these equations can be solved for (ci
1,ci
0,λ i) independently of ˆ mi and  i,a s
a function of (p,w) but not xi. Because the only way consumers diﬀer here
is with respect to xi, (ci
1,ci
0,λ i)=( c1,c0,λ) is the same for all i.G i v e nλ,
(41) can be solved for ˆ mi independently of  i, as a function of (p,w) but
not xi. Notice that in (41) we did not index V 0 by i,i m p l y i n gˆ mi =ˆ m for
all i; this follows from:
Lemma 4 Under the assumptions of Propostion 1, Wi(xi) and V i(ˆ mi) de-
pend on i,b u t∂Wi(xi)/∂xi = λ and ∂V i(ˆ mi)/∂ ˆ mi = V 0(ˆ mi) do not depend
on i.
Proof. Consider Wi(x).W eh a v e
∂Wi
∂x




The ﬁrst term vanishes by (40), so ∂Wi/∂xi = λ, which is independent of i
and xi. We show the other result below, after we have described V i in more
detail; see (47).
28We formalize the analysis of the ﬁrst-order conditions up to this point
as follows.
Lemma 5 Under the assumptions of Propostion 1, we have (ci
1,ci
0, ˆ mi,λ i)=
(c1,c0, ˆ m,λ) ∀i, independent of xi.
Proof. Follows from the discussion in the text.
Given (c1,c0, ˆ m,λ), (42) implies
 i =
pc0 +ˆ mi − xi
w + pc0 − pc1
=
pc0 + M − mi − pei − ∆i
w + pc0 − pc1
, (43)
so  i is linearly decreasing in xi and hence mi. But aggregate labor supply
¯   = ¯  (p,w)=
pc0 − p¯ e − ¯ ∆
w + pc0 − pc1
(44)
depends only on average real wealth, p¯ e + ¯ ∆. This means that aggregate
demand for the J consumption goods,
D(p,w)=¯  (p,w)c1(p,w)+
£
1 − ¯  (p,w)
¤
c0(p,w),
does not depend on the wealth distribution, or on monetary considerations
at all.
On the ﬁrm side, proﬁt maximization determines nk as a function of
(p,w).W ec a nn o wd e ﬁne market clearing by:
D(p,w) − Σkfk[nk(p,w)] − ¯ e =0
N(p,w) −  (p,w)=0 (45)
ˆ m(p,w) − M(1 + γ)=0
There are J +2equations and we only determine J +1prices (p,w),a sw e
have already normalized the price of money to 1.22 Existence of a solution to
22Walras Law also holds here: integrating the budget equations over agents, that if the
goods and labor markets clear the money market clears automatically.
29(45), which can be considered a “spot market equilibrium” or an equilibrium
in the CM, taking V i as given and well behaved, is established exactly as in
Proposition 5. Additionally, notice that the CM equilibrium is determined
independently of the DM q, which does not appear in the above equations:
the model displays the neoclassical dichotomy in Aruoba and Wright (2003).
One implication of this is that monetary policy does not aﬀect the CM, as
we discuss further below.23
To determine properties of V i we now proceed to the DM, beginning with
bargaining. Again we use the generalized Nash solution. Consider a meeting
between agents i and i0 where the former is the consumer and the latter the
producer. For the consumer, his payoﬀ is u(q)+β2Wi
+1(xi
+1 − d) and his
threatpoint β2Wi
+1(xi
+1),w h e r exi
+1 = p+1ei
+1 +ˆ mi +γ+1M+1 +∆i
+1 is his
wealth in the next CM if he does not trade. For the producer, his payoﬀ is
−ψ(q)+β2Wi0
+1(xi0
+1+d) and his threatpoint β2Wi0
+1(xi0
+1). Given that Wi
+1
and Wi0
+1 both have slope λ+1 by Lemma 4, where λ+1 is the same for all




θ [β2dλ+1 − ψ(q)]
1−θ , (46)
s.t. d ≤ ˆ mi.
As in LW, one can show that in any equilibrium the constraint holds
with equality. Substituting d =ˆ mi into (46), the ﬁrst-order condition with







u(q) − β2dˆ miλ+1
¤
ψ0(q).
23Of course, M and γ enter the CM clearing conditions through ˆ m = M + γM,b u t
c1, c0 and ¯   are independent of M and γ. Or, as in the previous footnote, we can ignore
money-market clearing by Walras Law.
30This can be rearranged into β2 ˆ miλ+1 = g(q),w h e r eg(·) is exactly the same
as (31) from the LW model. Since ˆ mi = M+1 for all i, in equilibrium,

















Notice V i is indexed by i,b e c a u s exi
+1 = p+1ei
+1 +ˆ mi +γ+1M+1 +∆i
+1
can diﬀer across individuals. However, as claimed in Lemma 4, the derivative
∂V i
∂ ˆ mi = σu0(q)q0(ˆ mi)+( 1− σ)β2λ+1 =
∙





does not depend on i,w h e r ew eg e tq0(ˆ mi)=β2λ+1u0(q)/g0(q) from the
bargaining solution. Inserting (47) into (41), we have
λ = β
∙















Observe that (49) is identical to (36). Hence, in terms of the DM, the
new model has exactly the same p r e d i c t i o n sa sL W .O fc o u r s et h eC Md i ﬀers
across the two models, because very diﬀerent commodities are being traded
(and in particular, the new model generates equilibrium unemployment, as
we discuss in the next section). Still, it is the case that the assumption of
only spot trades in the CM is without loss in generality here, as in LW.
This is perhaps less clear here because, e.g., we have arbitrary endowments
across agents, so one might think they would want to borrow or lend; but
31as long as they are at an interior solution, they would just as soon increase
or decrease  i, and again asset markets are not needed.
Before closing this section, we discuss the maintained assumption  i ∈
(0,1) for all i, using the ideas in Propostion 4. In equilibrium all agents
enter each CM with one of three values of m: m =0if they consumed in the
previous DM; m =2 M if they produced in the previous DM; and m = M if







w+pc0−pc1 if m =0
pc0−pei−∆i
w+pc0−pc1 if m = M
pc0−M−pei−∆i
w+pc0−pc1 if m =2 M
(50)
As in the proof of Proposition 4 there are two cases: w + pc0 − pc1 > 0,





















. For brevity we present only the former.24
In this case, for a given i,( 5 0 )i m p l i e s :
 i > 0 ∀i iﬀ pei + ∆i < pc0 − M ∀i (51)
 i < 1 ∀i iﬀ pei + ∆i >M− w + pc1 ∀i (52)
Or, to put this in real terms, use the bargaining solution to eliminate M =
g(q−1)/β2λ and rearrange to get:
 i > 0 ∀i iﬀ g(q−1) <β 2λ(pc0 − pei − ∆i) ≡ Γi
1 ∀i (53)
 i < 1 ∀i iﬀ g(q−1) <β 2λ(pei + ∆i − pc1 + w) ≡ Γi
2 ∀i (54)
This yields bounds on g(q−1), Γi
1 and Γi
2. They are independent of monetary
considerations — i.e. they take on the same values in the nonmonetary
economy where M =0— and are strictly positive iﬀ  i ∈ (0,1) in the



















for all i, we are done.
B u ti ti se a s yt os e et h a tg is increasing and q<q ∗ at every date in any
equilibrium, where u0(q∗)=ψ0(q∗),e x a c t l ya si nL W .H e n c ei ti se a s yt o
impose conditions that guarantee interiority.25
We summarize the results as follows:







∀i,w h e r eΓi
1 and Γi
2 are deﬁned in (53) and (54). Given this,
the equilibrium q sequence satisﬁes (49), which is exactly the same as the
LW model.
4 The Phillips Curve
Simple versions of LW-type models dichotomize: as we discussed above, one
can solve for the allocations in the CM and DM independently. A conse-
quence of this is that money does not aﬀect aggregate production or con-
sumption in the CM, although it does aﬀect real output since q is a real
variable (i.e. dichotomy is not neutrality). In particular, the fraction of
agents who are unemployed, 1− ¯  , is independent of the money growth rate,
γ, and therefore the long-run Phillips curve is vertical.26
There are various ways to get around the dichotomy. For instance
Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2005) discuss how to proceed by generaliz-
ing the technology. Here we proceed by generalizing preferences. A key
25Intuitively, we need to have the DM not too important, in the sense that q is not too
big, because otherwise the value of money is too high and this either forces some people
to   =1(those with no money trying to aquire ˆ m), or forces some people to   =0(those
with lots of money trying to spend down to ˆ m).
26To be accurate, money does aﬀect the distribution of  
i across agents entering the
CM with diﬀerent m
i, as indicated by (43); but it has no eﬀect on aggregate employment
¯  .
33assumption in the previous section is that utility is additively separable be-
tween the CM and DM. We now assume the utility of consumption in the
DM is u(q,c,h). To ease the presentation, we assume there is only one CM
consumption good c, that the endowment of c is 0,t h a tβ1 =1 ,a n dt h a t
the CM technology is c = Bh, so the real wage is B and xi = mi + γM.
Also, we write CM utility as simply −v(h),w i t hv(1) = A and v(0) = 0,
without is without loss in generality since we already have c in u(q,c,h).27
As we did earlier, we use mi as the CM state variable. The CM problem
in terms of state-contingent commodites is








[pc(s)+ˆ m(s) − pBh(s) − m − γM]ds ≤ 0,
w h e r ew eh a v el e f to ﬀ the superscript i to save space, but otherwise the only
innovation is that (ˆ m,c,h) is the state variable for V , since these are all
predetermined (and now also relevant) for the DM. The usual logic reduces
the CM problem to
W(m)=m a x V (ˆ m1,c 1,1) −  A +( 1−  )V (ˆ m0,c 0,0)
s.t.  pc1 +( 1−  )pc0 +  ˆ m1 +( 1−  )ˆ m0 − pB  − m − γM ≤ 0.
First-order conditions for an interior solution are:
ch : Vc (ˆ mh,c h,h) − λp =0 , h =0 ,1 (55)
ˆ mh : Vm (ˆ mh,c h,h) − λ =0 , h =0 ,1 (56)
  : V (ˆ m1,c 1,1) − V (ˆ m0,c 0,0) − A = λp(c1 − c0 − B + ˆ m1−ˆ m0
p )(57)
λ : pB  + m + γM −  pc1 − (1 −  )pc0 −  ˆ m1 − (1 −  )ˆ m0 =0 (58)
27One interpretation is that the CM good c is purchased in the ﬁrst subperiod but only
consumed in the second, after participating in the DM; this is not particularly important,
especially given β1 =1 .
34Given V , (55)-(57) constitute 5 equations that determine (c1,c 0, ˆ m1, ˆ m0,λp),
independently of   or m; then (58) determines  .N o t i c et h a tw ed on o tg e t
a degenerate distribution, but a two point distribution, of money holdings,
since in general ˆ m1 6=ˆ m0. Also, notice that W0 = λ.W e s t i l l h a v e w o r k
ahead of us, however, since we still have to analyze V .28
We begin with bargaining. Consider a match where the buyer has some
arbitrary (ˆ m,c,h) and the seller (˜ m,˜ c,˜ h).S i n c e W0
+1 = λ+1, generalizing
the analysis in the previous section, the generalized Nash solution is
max
q,d
[u(q,c,h) − u(0,c,h) − βλ+1d]
θ [βλ+1d − ψ(q)]
1−θ
s.t. d ≤ ˆ m. Notice the only place ˆ m enters the problem is through the
constraint, and (˜ m,˜ c,˜ h) does not enter the problem at all. As before, the
constraint d ≤ ˆ m must bind, and the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to q
is:
θuq(q,ˆ c,ˆ h)[βλ+1 ˆ m − ψ(q)] = (1 − θ)
h
u(q,ˆ c,ˆ h) − u(0,ˆ c,ˆ h) − βλ+1 ˆ m
i
ψ0(q)
This can be rewritten βλ+1 ˆ m = g(q,c,h),w h e r e
g(q,c,h) ≡
θuq(q,c,h)ψ(q)+( 1− θ)[u(q,c,h) − u(0,c,h)]ψ0(q)
θuq(q,c,h)+( 1− θ)ψ0(q)
.
In general, q = q(ˆ m,ch,h) depends on the buyer’s entire state vector, al-
though when θ =1 , g(q,c,h)=ψ(q) and q depends only on ˆ m.I na n yc a s e ,
there are two values of qh = q(ˆ mh,c h,h), in equilibrium, corresponding to
h =1 ,0 (consumers who were employed and unemployed).
28In the previous section we could say a lot about the CM equilibium even before






i) independently of ˆ m
i. The whole point of this section is to study cases which
do not dichotomize.
35Given this,
V (ˆ mh,c h,h)=σ [u(qh,c h,h)+βW+1(0)] (59)
+σE[u(0,c h,h) − ψ(q)+βW+1(ˆ mh + d)]
+(1 − 2σ)[u(0,c h,h)+βW+1(ˆ mh)]
where the expectation in the second term is over q and d, which now depend
for producers on the type of consumer they meet. Thus,
Vm = βλ+1
∙











takes into account the eﬀect of c on q in bargaining. If θ =1 , however,
producers get 0 surplus from trade, so
V (ˆ mh,c h,h)=σ [u(qh,c h,h)+βW+1(0)] (62)
+(1 − σ)[u(0,c h,h)+βW+1(ˆ mh)]
and this eﬀect vanishes:
Vc =( 1− σ)uc(0,c h,h)+σuc(qh,c h,h). (63)
Using (59)-(61) to eliminate V and the bargaining solution to eliminate
36ˆ mh, (55)-(57) become:
σuc(qh,c h,h)+( 1− σ)uc(0,c h,h)=σµ(qh,c h,h)+λp, h =0 ,1
βλ+1
∙




= λ, h =0 ,1
λp(c1 − c0 − B)+A = σ[u(q1,c 1,1) − u(q0,c 0,0)]
+(1 − σ)[u(0,c 1,1) − u(0,c 0,0)]
−
λ−(1−σ)βλ+1
λ+1β [g(q1,c 1,1) − g(q0,c 0,0)]
At this stage we look for a steady state where all real variables including
pλ are constant, which implies λ/λ+1 =1+γ.29 Then the above system
simpliﬁes to:






, h =0 ,1 (65)
λp(c1 − c0 − B)+A = σ [u(q1,c 1,1) − u(q0,c 0,0)] (66)
+(1 − σ)[u(0,c 1,1) − u(0,c 0,0)]
−(i + σ)[g(q1,c 1,1) − g(q0,c 0,0)]
This is a relatively simple structure. Given i, (64)-(66) constitute 5 equa-
tions that can be solved for (c1,c 0,q 1,q 0,pλ). Then aggregate employment
is simply
¯   =
c0
B + c0 − c1
. (67)
Finally, inserting the bargaining solution βλ+1 ˆ mh = g(qh,c h,h) into ¯  ˆ m1 +
(1 − ¯  )ˆ m0 = M(1 + γ), we can solve for the marginal value of money
λ =
¯  g(q1,c 1,1) + (1 − ¯  )g(q0,c 0,0)
βM
,
29Money market clearing requires  ˆ m1+(1− )ˆ m0 = M(1+γ). Inserting the bargaining
solution, we have [ ψ(q1)+( 1−  )ψ(q2)] = β2λ+1M(1 + γ). Hence, Mλ+1 is constant in
steady state, and λ (which is, after all, the marginal utility of money) falls at the rate at
which M grows.
37which pins down the nominal price level p, given we already solved for pλ.I t
is obvious that this system does not dichotomize, and hence money aﬀects
the CM allocation (c1,c 0, ¯  ).
Thus the model is straightforward, in general. It is particularly simple
when we assume (with a slight abuse of notation) that u(q,c,h)=u(q,c),
since then c1 = c0 = c, ˆ m1 =ˆ m0 =ˆ m and g(q,c,h)=g(q,c).T h e n

























where a w b means a and b are equal in sign and
D =[ σucc(q,c)+( 1− σ)ucc(0,c)]kψ00




By (67), in the case under consideration, ¯   = c/B. Then the steady-state
unemployment rate 1 − ¯   depends on the i and hence inﬂation according to






































. In general this will involve
third derivatives of u and ψ.W h e n θ =1 , however, g = ψ,a n dVc is given by (63), so
only second derivatives of show up.
38This result is extremely intuitive. Inﬂa t i o ni sat a xo nD Ma c t i v i t y ,a n da s
such it unambiguously reduces q.I fucq > 0 (q and c are complements) then
inﬂation also reduces c and hence ¯  .B u ti fucq < 0 (q and c are substitutues)
then inﬂation increases c and hence increases ¯  . In the latter case, inﬂation
causes people to substitute out of DM goods and into CM goods, leading to
an increase in CM employment. We get a downward-sloping Phillips curve
under simple and natural conditions. Summarizing:
Proposition 7 When u(q,c,h)=u(q,c) and θ =1the model has a long-
run relation between inﬂation and unemployment that slopes down iﬀ ucq <
0.
The case u(q,c,h)=U(c)+u(q,h) is also fairly easy, as it again implies
c1 = c0, although not ˆ m1 =ˆ m0. Furthermore, g(q,c,h)=g(q,h). Letting















































w g(q0,0) − g(q1,1)
39Using the fact that ¯   = c/B,
∂(1 − ¯  )
∂i
w g(q1,1) − g(q0,0),
and unemployment decreases with inﬂation if g(q1,1) <g (q0,0).
Consider the case θ =1 .T h e n g(q,h)=ψ(q), and it is easy to show
that g(q1,1) <g (q0,0) iﬀ q1 <q 0 iﬀ uqh < 0. ∂(1 − ¯  )/∂i w uqh.M o r e o v e r ,





σuqq(qh,h) − (σ + i)ψ0(qh)
< 0.
These results are also extremely intuitive. Inﬂation reduces q.T h e n i f
uqh > 0 (q and h are complements, or q and leisure are substitutes) this
increases leisure and hence reduces ¯  .B u t i f ucq < 0 (q and leisure are
complements) then inﬂation reduces leisure and hence increases ¯  .
Proposition 8 When u(q,c,h)=u(q,h) and θ =1the model has a long-
r u nr e l a t i o nb e t w e e ni n ﬂation and unemployment that slopes down iﬀ uqh <
0.
5C o n c l u s i o n
40Appendix 1: Second-order conditions
Here we check the second-order conditions for a strict local maximum to
the consumer’s problem, assuming   ∈ (0,1).T h eﬁrst-order conditions for
an interior solution are given by (19)-(22). The bordered Hessian evaluated





0 − p −(1 −  )p w − pc1 + pc0
− pT  H1 00
−(1 −  )pT 0( 1 −  )H0 0




For a maximum we need the last 2J−1 leading principal minors |B3|,|B4|,...|B2J+2|
to alternate in sign, with |B2J+2| < 0.T ob e g i n ,
|B2J+2| = −(w − pc1 + pc0)
2  (1 −  )|H1||H0| < 0,
since |Hh| < 0 by the strict concavity of U. Second, consider






with j ∈ {2,...J}.H e r e pj =( p1,...p j) and Hhj is the submatrix of Hh
deﬁned by deleting all but the ﬁrst j columns and rows. By the strict





0 − p −(1 −  )pj
− pT  H1 0
−(1 −  )pT
j 0( 1 −  )H0j
⎤
⎦
with j ≤ J.T h e n
|B1+J+j| =( 1−  )Ujj(c0,0)|BJ+j| − (1 −  )2p2
j (1 −  )|H1||H0j−1|.
By induction, |B1+J+j| has the same sign as (−1)J+j.T os e et h i s ,n o t et h a t
|BJ+2| has the same sign as (−1)J+1 and |H1||H0j−1| has the same sign as
41(−1)J+j−1. Therefore any point that satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order conditions is a
strict local maximum. ¥
Appendix 2. Global maximum
Here we use the results in Appendix 1 to show that a solution to the ﬁrst-
order conditions constitutes the global maximum. We begin by breaking the
problem into two steps. First deﬁne
V( )=m a x
c1,c0
[ U(c1,1) + (1 −  )U(c0,0)]
s.t.  pc1 +( 1−  )pc0 −  w − x ≤ 0.
Since U is strictly concave, this problem has a unique solution [c0( ),c1( )].
By the Theorem of the Maximum, V( ) is continuous and hence achieves a
maximum over   ∈ [0,1].
Suppose there are two local maxima. Then by continuity V( ) also has a
local minimum at some ˜   ∈ (0,1).T h e n[c0(˜  ),c1(˜  ), ˜  ] is a saddle-point of
the problem in Appendix 1, which contradicts the result that any solution
to the ﬁrst-order conditions is a local maximum. Hence there is a unique
maximizer of V( ),s a yˆ  ,a n d[c0(ˆ  ),c1(ˆ  ), ˆ  ] is the unique solution to the
problem in Appendix 1. ¥
Appendix 3. Second-order conditions for monetary model
Here we check second-order conditions for a monetary economy with one
consumption good (although this is a special case of the results in Appendix
1 ,i tm a yb eu s e f u lt os e eas i m p l ee x a m p l e ) .T h eﬁrst-order conditions are
42given by (38)-(42). The bordered Hessian is
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
0 − p −(1 −  )p −1 w − pc1 + pc0
− p  U11(c1,1) 0 0 0
−(1 −  )p 0( 1 −  )U11(c0,0) 0 0
−10 0 V 00(ˆ m)0
w − pc1 + pc0 00 0 0
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
At this stage it is an exercise to check that the relevant principal minors
take the correct sign. ¥
Appendix 4. Competitive pricing in DM
We consider here a version of the model where the DM is a standard
competitive market. The price of DM goods is P. The problem of an agent
holding ˆ m units of money who wants to consume is
max
q [u(q)+β2W+1(ˆ m − Pq)] s.t. Pq≤ ˆ m. (68)
The problem of an agent who can produce is
max
q [−ψ(q)+β2W+1(ˆ m + Pq)]. (69)
Since there is the same measure σ of buyers and sellers, market clearing
means the solution to these two problems must be the same q.
O n ec a ns h o wt h ec o n s t r a i n tPq≤ ˆ m binds in any equilibrium, just like
under bargaining. Hence, the solution to (68) is q =ˆ m/P. Inserting this into
the ﬁrst-order condition from (69), we have ψ0(q)=β2W0
+1(ˆ m+Pq)P.Notice
from the buyer’s problem that q0(ˆ m)=1 /P = β2λ+1/ψ0(q) and β2λ+1M =
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